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Small businesses shoulder significant costs in order to comply with the
maze of government regulation that impacts commerce. The Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) was designed to alleviate that burden by making
regulators more accountable in their enforcement of agency mandates.
The RFA just celebrated its thirtieth birthday, and despite being one of the
most important pieces of business legislation, it has yet to fulfill its
promise. This article examines not just the calls for statutory reform, but
also the motivations and perceptions of the individuals most impacted by
business regulation. We propose that while legal reform can be helpful,
actions can be taken from both sides of the regulation equation to make the
regulatory environment less hostile to small business while still
substantially meeting agency goals. The underlying theme is that increased
interactivity by both the government and the governed, and not simply
statutory reform, will be most effective in bringing the long-delayed
potential of the RFA to fruition.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, during the waning days of the Carter administration and
while the Iranian hostage crises captured the attention of America,
Congress quietly passed (and the President signed) some of the most
influential business legislation of the decade. This legislation was
influential not because it was yet another law designed to reign in business
practices. Rather, the legislation was so influential because its purpose was
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to do quite the opposite, by helping vulnerable small companies interact
with the very regulation and regulators that made doing business so
challenging.
That legislation, known today as the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA), had the potential to fundamentally reshape how regulators
interpreted, applied, and enforced the tens of thousands of rules and
dictates that impact American commerce. The RFA would force
administrative agencies to weigh the outcome of their actions. More
importantly, it would also create a climate of interactivity between small
business leaders and regulators that never before existed in the federal
system. This interactivity gave the RFA the power to fundamentally
redefine the relationship between government and governed. The RFA also
has the distinction of being one of the least-examined pieces of business
legislation, relative to its potential influence, in the past thirty years.
In short, the RFA represents a concerted effort to reduce
administrative burdens by compelling federal agencies to take small firm
concerns into account as part of the rulemaking process.1 The RFA
requires, among other things, that an administrative agency promulgating a
rule certify that a regulation will not significantly harm a substantial
number of small businesses. If the agency cannot certify this, then it must
conduct a deeper analysis examining the rule‘s negative impact on small
businesses and possible methods of reducing that burden.2 The RFA‘s goal
was meant to be nothing less than a culture shift in federal bureaucracy
towards an appreciation of the value of small businesses. It was designed
to instill a desire, or at least create an obligation, to accommodate their
unique interests.3
Yet thirty years later, controversy over the effectiveness of the RFA
continues, and the need for reform has never been more pressing. Small
businesses continue to suffer disproportionately from the cost of
regulations. According to a recent study, small businesses (defined as
firms with twenty or fewer employees) faced an annual regulatory cost of
$10,585 per employee, thirty-six percent more than the regulatory cost
facing large businesses (defined as firms with five hundred or more
employees).4 The promised sensitivity to business and interactivity
between business and government has never been realized.

1. Keith W. Holman, The Regulatory Flexibility Act at 25: Is the Law Achieving Its
Goal?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119, 1119 (2006).
2. Sarah E. Shive, If You’ve Always Done it That Way, It’s Probably Wrong: How the
Regulatory Flexibility Act Has Failed to Change Agency Behavior, and How Congress Can
Fix It, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 153, 157-58 (2006).
3. Holman, supra note 1, at 1119-20.
4. Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms,
(U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Office of Advocacy, Washington, D.C.), 2010, at iv.
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At the same time, public criticism of agency effectiveness in general
has become severe. In the summer of 2010, in the wake of the British
Petroleum (BP) oil spill, national attention focused on the manifest failures
of some of the largest regulatory agencies. The leadership of the Minerals
Management Service, after years of criticism, was finally replaced.
President Obama told the country that the new agency chief‘s main task
would be to ―build an organization that acts as the oil industry‘s watchdog,
not its partner.‖5 New agencies like the Consumer Finance Protection
Bureau were created to regulate matters affecting the interests of
consumers and financial institutions. Furthermore, the President has
mandated that agencies increase transparency and participation in their
rulemaking processes by using the internet.6 Federal agencies were
required to create ―open government plans‖ with several specific elements
to increase public information, engagement and collaboration.7 These
government mandates represent valuable reinforcement for the goals of the
RFA, although they have not been widely recognized as such. By requiring
agencies to make their rulemaking more transparent and increasing
opportunities for feedback during the process, these initiatives have
increased the ability of small businesses to convey their concerns to
regulators and engage in a productive dialogue before unnecessarily
burdensome regulations go on the books.
A new approach to the underlying goals of the RFA, one that
empowers small businesses, taps the potential creativity of regulators and
streamlines the interactivity between government and its citizens, could
have a much greater impact. Given the small chance of a mutually
satisfactory resolution between small business owners and regulators who
follow the letter of the RFA, this article eschews a primary focus on the
standard account. Instead, the purpose of this article is to encourage
interactive regulation from both the businessperson‘s and regulator‘s
perspectives. We recommend strategies for business people to more
effectively interact with government agencies. We also recommend
strategies for regulators to make their processes more open and receptive to
input.
The goal for small businesses is not the prevention of all future
regulation that could possibly affect their business, but instead to establish
5. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on
the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill.
6. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dep‘ts and
Agencies on Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/transparencyandopengovernment/.
7. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads
of Executive Dep‘ts & Agencies, Open Government Directive, at 4 (Dec. 8, 2009), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf.
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a collaborative effort with government that maximizes the goals of federal
mandates while minimizing the costs imposed on operations. This change
not only requires a different approach, but a more interactive perspective
toward regulation and the RFA. The purpose of this paper is to make this
new interactive approach a reality.
Part II of this article examines the history, development, and current
treatment of the RFA. This Part will show that although the RFA has been
subject to significant criticism, it still has the potential to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of agencies, and, in particular, their regulation
of small businesses. Part III of this article turns its attention to the
perceptions and actions of small businesses. This Part reveals that small
business leaders carry with them strongly negative attitudes about
regulation and government that impair their ability to act effectively on
behalf of their organizations. In addition, this Part shows that regulators
are not simply passive mirrors of their agency goals, but are dynamic and
reactive to the environment around them.
Part IV presents strategies for small enterprise owners to more
effectively interact with regulators through a variety of means. As we
explain in Part IV, providing regulators with more detailed, accurate and
current information about the specific challenges small enterprises face
should help regulators work more efficiently to balance the needs of small
enterprises with broader social, commercial and environmental goals.
Part V presents strategies for federal agencies to improve their
responsiveness to small businesses by opening new portals for
communication. In this section, we suggest lessons that federal agencies
can learn from state-level innovations and recommend other strategies as
well. This article concludes that interaction with government that is based
on a development of mutual trust and commitment toward resolution,
although less viscerally satisfying than traditional approaches, can over the
long-term produce a more favorable competitive environment for
businesses and more flexible opportunities for regulators to satisfy
legislative commands.
II.

THE PURPOSE, FUNCTION, AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RFA

A.

The History and Substance of the RFA

During the 1970s, Congress became increasingly concerned with the
growing burden that federal regulation imposed on small businesses.8 In a
series of hearings, Congress learned that small businesses were being

8. Barry A. Pineles, The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act: New
Options in Regulatory Relief, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 29, 30 (1997).
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grossly underrepresented in regulatory proceedings and that single-solution
regulation, applied uniformly to all businesses, disproportionately burdened
small companies.9 Frustrated small business representatives attended a
1980 conference on small business hosted by the White House.10 Many
business attendees expressed frustration over the growing regulatory
burdens and paperwork demands that federal regulations required.11
Congress responded by passing the RFA. Enacted with relatively little
fanfare in 1980,12 President Carter stated that the new regulation would
―give[] Americans their money‘s worth.‖13 The RFA took effect on
January 1, 1981.14
In short, the RFA requires federal agencies to consider the impact of
their regulatory proposals on small businesses before imposing new rules.
This requires that an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) be
published in the Federal Register at the time a new rule is proposed.15 The
IRFA must include the rationale behind the proposed rule, its goals, the
type and number of affected entities, a description of compliance
requirements, and the need for any professional skills required to comply
with the rule.16 The IRFA must also identify any existing rules that might
conflict or overlap with the proposed rule, and must contain alternative
options that would achieve the agency‘s objections in a less burdensome
fashion.17 Later in the rulemaking process, agencies must also prepare a
final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA), which discloses the rule‘s
rationale and objectives, a summary of issues raised during the public
comment period, an evaluation of those issues, a list of any changes made
in response to public comments, and a statement of why the agency
rejected available alternatives.18
The RFA leaves an escape clause, however, for agencies to avoid this
entire process. The head of an agency may simply certify that the rule will
not impose a ―significant economic impact on a substantial number of
9. Id. For a detailed review of Congressional hearings preceding the passage of the
RFA, see Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 213 (1982).
10. Pineles, supra note 8, at 30.
11. Id.
12. Verkuil, supra note 9, at 214.
13. Id. at 215 (quoting THE WHITE HOUSE, REGULATORY REFORM: PRESIDENT CARTER‘S
PROGRAM 2 (1980)).
14. Id. at 252.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2006).
16. Id. at § 603(b).
17. Id.
18. Id. at § 604(a). The RFA also imposes a periodic review requirement of all rules,
requiring federal agencies to review all of their existing regulations over a period of ten
years, eliminating those which are duplicative, unduly burdensome, or unnecessary.
5 U.S.C. § 610 (2006).
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small entities‖ if promulgated.19 If that occurs, then the agency simply has
to publish the certification and need not undergo further regulatory
analysis.20 While some agencies have developed definitions for the terms
‗significant impact‘ and ‗substantial number‘ on their own, other agencies
have left interpretation of the statute up to the discretion of individual
members in the agency.21 As a result, this initial determination of whether
a proposed regulation will affect small businesses, made mainly within the
discretion of the agency, determines whether the rigorous RFA analyses are
implemented fully or circumvented altogether.
The potential for abuse of this discretionary opt-out provision was
only one of the RFA‘s weaknesses. Another was the difficulties that small
businesses faced in redressing agency noncompliance with the RFA.
Certainly, concern for small businesses was always at the heart of the
RFA.22 Even in its original form, the RFA recognized the need for more
nuanced treatment of these businesses, acknowledging that ―unnecessary
regulations create entry barriers in many industries and discourage potential
entrepreneurs from introducing beneficial products and processes.‖23 In its
early years, however, small businesses had no way to protect their interests
when agencies failed to follow the RFA‘s requirements.
In 1996, the RFA was amended by the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA).24 Until that amendment, small
business owners who felt that new or proposed regulations had been
promulgated in violation of the RFA had no legal recourse. In response to
pressure from the small business community, which felt that many agencies
were not complying with the terms of the RFA, the SBREFA strengthened
the RFA by providing for a judicial review process.25 The SBREFA‘s
judicial review provisions allow small businesses to file a complaint
regarding a potential violation of the RFA up to a year after the agency has
published the rule.26 If a court finds that the agency has not complied with
the RFA, it may remand the rule to the agency and delay enforcement of
the rule until the agency has analyzed the rule, as required.27 The SBREFA
also tightened the factual requirements for agency certifications by
19. Id. at § 605(b).
20. Id.
21. Shive, supra note 2, at 158.
22. Holman, supra note 1, at 1119; Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal
Agencies’ Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Periodic Review
Requirement—And Current Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1199,
1201 (2006).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose).
24. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2006).
26. Id. at § 611(a)(3)(A).
27. Id. at § 611(a)(4).
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requiring that agencies articulate a specific factual basis that supports the
agency‘s statement of certification.28 Finally, the SBREFA required the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration convene small business advocacy review panels to consult
with small businesses on regulations expected to have a significant impact
on them before the regulations are published for comment.29
In August 2002, the RFA was further strengthened when President
Bush signed Executive Order 13,272.30 That order mandated all federal
agencies to develop written policies describing how they measured the
impact of proposed legislation on small businesses.31 It also gave further
definition to the process by which agencies were to work with the Small
Business Administration (SBA) Office of Advocacy to develop alternatives
to legislation that would significantly affect a substantial number of small
businesses, and required the SBA to develop training for the agencies on
how to comply with the RFA.32
Subsequent efforts to improve the RFA have failed. In 2007, the
House Small Business Committee unanimously approved a bill to add new
requirements to the RFA.33 If passed, the bill would have required agencies
to consider the indirect impacts of their proposed legislation on small
businesses as well as the direct impacts as the RFA already mandated.34
The bill would also have required federal agencies to conduct a periodic
review of all of their regulations to determine whether any of them should
be modified or eliminated.35 However, the bill never reached the House or
Senate for review.
Although the RFA has not evolved significantly for several years,
many states have enacted their own versions of the RFA. Some states have
adopted versions of a model ―mini-RFA‖ that the SBA has developed. In
May 2009, for example, Connecticut amended the state‘s regulatory
processes to help ensure that new rules and regulations do not
unnecessarily burden small businesses.36 These state laws share the RFA‘s
goal of increasing agency appreciation for entrepreneurs and small business
owners and encouraging interaction between agencies and small
28. Id. at § 605(b).
29. Id. at § 609(b), (d).
30. Exec. Order No. 13,272, 67 Fed. Reg. 159, (August 13, 2002).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. H.R. 4458, 110th Cong. (2007).
34. Id. at § 3.
35. Id. at § 5; General Policy: House Small Business Committee Endorses More
Federal Review of Regulatory Burdens, NAT‘L ENVTL. DAILY, Dec. 14, 2007.
36. Connecticut Is Latest New England State To Strengthen Regulatory Flexibility for
Small Business, SMALL BUS. ADVOCATE (U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Office of Advocacy,
Washington, D.C.), May 1, 2009, at 8.
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businesses. Other state laws, however, try to achieve this general goal
through a number of different means. In some instances, innovations on
the state level have succeeded where the RFA arguably has not. Part V
below discusses some effective state versions in more detail and explores
ways in which these variations might serve as a model for further reform of
the RFA.
B.

Perceived Weaknesses in the Statutory Language

Both government and academic commentators have acknowledged the
numerous weaknesses in the statutory language of the RFA. Most
prominently, critics have noted that a number of vague terms in the RFA
impede clear and consistent application across agencies. As noted earlier,
the RFA requires agencies to consider alternatives when they determine
that a proposed regulation will have a ―significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.‖37 Scholars analyzing the RFA‘s
effectiveness have pointed out the relative vagueness of the terms
―significant‖ and ―substantial number.‖ As one author notes, without
further clarification, these terms are ―completely discretionary.‖38
Another author expressed concern over the meaning of the words
―small entities.‖ The RFA defines the term as having the same meaning as
―‗small business concern‘ under section 3 of the Small Business Act.‖39
The Small Business Act, in turn, defines a small business concern as one
that is ―independently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its
field of operation.‖40 Further size standards can be established41 and
agencies typically use elaborate SBA standards tailored to particular
industries.42 The result has been unusual classifications for small
businesses. For example, the SBA defines small entities for cable and pay
television as firms generating $11 million or less in revenue annually.43 At
one point, this definition resulted in 1423 of the 1758 cable and pay
television firms in existence to fall under the ambit of small entity
protection.44 This led one author to call the ―small entity‖ definition
37. 5 U.S.C. § 609(a) (2006).
38. Shive, supra note 2, at 167; See, supra note 22, at 1223-24.
39. 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (2006). The section uses the term ―small business,‖ but also
states that the term ―small entity‖ should be given the same meaning. Id. at § 601(6). Small
entity is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 601(6) as including ―small business‖ too. Id.
40. 15 U.S.C. 632(a)(1) (2006).
41. Id. at § 632(a)(2)(A).
42. Michelle Goldberg-Cahn, Note, Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley: A
Balanced Approach to Judicial Review Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 51 ADMIN. L.
REV. 663, 670 (1999).
43. Id. at 671 n.45 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 121.201 (1998)).
44. Id.
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―tenuous‖ and to conclude that, ―[s]urprisingly, a small entity may include
a national organization generating millions of dollars and employing
thousands of workers . . . . Thus, the group that the RFA attempts to
protect, small entities, has many definitions, the meanings of which vastly
differ among industries and people.‖45
Another troublingly vague provision is the RFA‘s requirement, under
Section 610, that agencies review their own regulations every ten years.
Scholars have noted that different agencies interpret this requirement
differently.46 Some agencies, including the Department of Transportation,
interpret Section 610‘s terms to mean that they must review all of their
regulations every ten years.47 Other agencies, including the Environmental
Protection Agency, understand Section 610 to require them only to review
those regulations that the agency believed would have a ―significant impact
on a substantial number of small entities‖ when the regulations were
adopted.48
Then there is the question of when that ten-year clock starts to run.
Michael See has noted that some agencies take the view that amending a
rule ―‗restarts the clock,‘ allowing the agency another ten years for RFA
review from the date of amendment‖ rather than the date that the initial rule
was adopted.49 For example, See notes that with regard to a 1993
Department of Commerce regulation limiting the pollock fishing season
that was amended in 1996, the Department of Commerce would likely
argue that it had ten years from the date of the amendment to review the
rule, rather than ten years from the date of the original regulation‘s
enactment in 1993.50 The variability among agency interpretations of
Section 610‘s requirements further reduces the RFA‘s effectiveness overall.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has echoed the
concerns of scholars like Shive and See, repeatedly calling for reforms of
the RFA because its terms are so vague. In 1994, the GAO noted that the
terms of the RFA lend themselves to an impossibly wide range of
interpretations, leading to widely divergent results.51 In 2002 and 2006, the
GAO issued additional critiques of the RFA on several of the same grounds
as its 1994 report.52 In each of these reports, the GAO urged Congress to
45. Id. at 670–71.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) (2006); Shive, supra note 2, at 163.
47. Shive, supra note 2, at 163.
48. Id.
49. See, supra note 22, at 1220.
50. Id. at 1221.
51. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-94-105, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ACT: STATUS OF AGENCIES‘ COMPLIANCE (1994).
52. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-998T, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ACT: CONGRESS SHOULD REVISIT AND CLARIFY ELEMENTS OF THE ACT TO IMPROVE ITS
EFFECTIVENESS (2006); U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-491T, REGULATORY
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provide the SBA with the authority to interpret the RFA‘s requirements,
reasoning that a uniform interpretation would lend more consistency to
agency understanding and implementation of the RFA‘s terms.
Another recognized weakness of the RFA is its failure to reach
regulations that indirectly affect small businesses, even though their
eventual impact may be greater than direct regulation.53 For example, the
EPA‘s certification of ozone emission standards, which states regulate, has
been held to be exempt from the RFA‘s provisions because the standards
do not directly affect small businesses.54 There was little debate that the
certification affected small businesses; the SBA, in fact, had advised the
EPA that the standards would substantially burden those businesses.55
Because the SBA served only as an advisory agency to the EPA on this
issue, however, the court refused to consider the SBA‘s determination in
evaluating the effect of the EPA regulations on small businesses.56 Indeed,
recent case law confirms that courts generally will not consider RFA-based
challenges to a regulation brought by small businesses that are only
indirectly affected by that regulation.57
Both scholars and government officials have called attention to this
failure.58 In 2006, Keith Holman, then the Assistant Chief Counsel in the
SBA‘s Office of Advocacy, noted that the RFA could be strengthened in
part by broadening the scope of the RFA to address both the direct and
indirect impacts of proposed regulation on small businesses.59 As noted
above, this issue was addressed in the ―Small Business Regulatory
Improvement Act‖ (HR 4458), introduced in December 2007, but the bill
did not reach either the House or the Senate for a vote.60
Critics have also noted that the RFA does little to address the
FLEXIBILITY ACT: CLARIFICATION OF KEY TERMS STILL NEEDED (2002).
53. Eric Phelps, The Cunning of Clever Bureaucrats: Why the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act Isn’t Working, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 123, 136–37
(2001).
54. Am. Trucking Ass‘n Inc. v. USEPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
55. Id. at 1044.
56. Id.
57. White Eagle Coop. Ass‘n v. Conner, 553 F.3d 467, 480 (7th Cir. 2009). The
rationale of this decision borrows explicitly from a long line of similar holdings in the
District of Columbia. See, e.g., Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 868–69
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that RFA did not require EPA to certify that there would be no
substantial effect on small business generators of hazardous waste); Mid-Tex Elec. Coop. v.
FERC, 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding FERC reasonably adopted a rule for valid
purposes).
58. Holman, supra note 1, at 1132.
59. Id.
60. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34355, THE REGULATORY
FLEXIBILITY ACT: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND PROPOSED REFORM 7, n.18 (2008),
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19430.pdf;
see
also
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-4458.
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cumulative impact of regulations that affect small businesses—the
problem, as Keith Holman called it, of ―death by a thousand cuts.‖61 Just as
the RFA fails to address regulations that indirectly affect small businesses,
it does little to address the cumulative effect of regulations that may not
have a ―significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities‖ individually, but which significantly affect those businesses over
time and in conjunction with other regulations. To help address this
problem, Holman has recommended that Congress codify Executive Order
13272, which requires agencies to analyze the cumulative and foreseeable
indirect effects of their regulations on small businesses.62
While many scholarly analyses and government reports have focused
on the RFA‘s flaws, few have discussed the RFA‘s limitations in light of
the unique challenges small businesses face. By focusing on the goals of
assisting small businesses, which was certainly a primary goal of the RFA,
scholars have tended to overlook the ways in which the regulators
themselves might benefit from a closer and more nuanced interaction with
their smaller targets.
C.

Perceived Weaknesses in the Application of the Statutory Language

Because agencies have great latitude to interpret the language of the
RFA as they see fit, different agencies can come to entirely different
conclusions about their meaning. That, in turn, can lead to disparity and
inconsistency in their application from agency to agency, and perhaps even
from year to year. Some interpretations may appear to be more self-serving
than sensible. Shive observed that in 1999, for example, the EPA
determined that one of its regulations would impose costs of $7,500 the
first year and $5,000 the next year on over 5,000 small businesses, and
require each of them to prepare a report that would take them
approximately 100 hours to complete. According to the EPA, this
regulation did not have a ―significant impact on a substantial number of
small businesses‖—a determination that the EPA has made for ninety-six
of the regulations it has passed since 1996.63
Just as agencies‘ interpretations of key RFA terms vary, agencies vary
greatly in their compliance with the RFA overall. A 1994 GAO report
found that the EPA and SEC were among the agencies exhibiting the most
comprehensive compliance with the RFA, while the IRS was among the
least compliant.64 The GAO offered variations on the same criticism in

61.
62.
63.
64.

Holman, supra note 1, at 1134.
Id. at 1135–36.
Shive, supra note 2, at 161.
U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 51, at 4, 7-8.
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their 2002 and 2006 RFA critiques as well.65 To what extent this variable
compliance is due to the agencies‘ differing interpretation of the RFA‘s
requirements, as opposed to other possible explanations such as the
agencies‘ failure to meet their statutory obligations as they understand
them, is not clear.
Agency compliance does appear to be improving, however. One
review of the RFA on its twenty-fifth anniversary, written by a member of
the SBA‘s Office of Advocacy, noted increasing agency compliance with
the RFA, and praised the RFA process for its effectiveness in enabling
agencies to write regulations that were more responsive to the concerns of
small businesses.66
Scholars have also suggested that agencies exercise this latitude under
the RFA to simply avoid the kind of burden analysis that the RFA was
meant to compel. As noted above, agencies considering a new regulation
are only required to conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis if they have
determined that the proposed regulation may have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small businesses. If the agency
determines that the proposed rule will not have such an impact, it can issue
a certification to that effect and forgo the analysis that would otherwise be
required.67 Because agencies can make that burden-reducing determination
unilaterally, scholars have noted, the RFA leaves too much room for abuse
of agency discretion.68 One Department of Labor employee seemed to
confirm this suspicion when he explained that ―[w]e routinely certified
[that] proposed rules would have no significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities without a second thought. We didn‘t even bother
to decide internally what constituted a ‗small entity,‘ or what ‗significant‘
meant either.‖69 Similarly, Keith Holman has noted that agencies can
circumvent the terms of the RFA by issuing guidance documents and
enforcement initiative consent agreements, neither of which employ the
notice and comment procedures that the RFA addresses.70
Other critics, including Eric Phelps, have expressed concern that
agencies have little incentive to comply with several RFA requirements
because there is little judicial review to hold them accountable for not
doing so.71 For example, as noted above, the RFA requires agencies to
conduct an initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) and consider
65. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 4-6.
66. Holman, supra note 1, at 1129–32.
67. 5 U.S.C § 605(b) (2006).
68. Phelps, supra note 53, at 134–35.
69. John Shanahan, Regulating the Regulators: Regulatory Process Reform in the 104th
Congress,
REGULATION,
Winter
1997,
available
at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv20n1/reg20n1b.html.
70. Holman, supra note 1, at 1133–34.
71. Phelps, supra note 53, at 133–39.
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whether any less burdensome alternatives are available.72 In Allied Local &
Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. U.S. EPA,73 where the EPA was accused of failing to
comply with this requirement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ruled that it had no jurisdiction to decide the issue.74 The only
RFA provisions subject to judicial review, according to the court, are the
subset of the RFA‘s provisions listed in the ―Judicial Review‖ provision at
5 U.S.C. § 611.75 As a result of this lack of jurisdiction to evaluate IRFA
compliance and the lack of judicial power to convene review panels, small
businesses cannot participate in this important early stage of the agency‘s
rulemaking process.76 They also cannot ensure that the SBREFA
objectives are carried out by the agency.77
What little judicial interpretation of the RFA there has been has set a
low bar for agency compliance, and courts have generally adopted a ―hands
off‖ policy toward the RFA. The RFA has been interpreted as a purely
procedural requirement, imposing no substantive constraint on agency
decision-making.78 Courts will not interfere with an agency‘s own
judgment of how to comply with the RFA‘s requirements, or whether it is
exempt from doing so, unless there is a flagrant abuse of the agency‘s
discretion. Courts have also taken a fairly narrow view of who has
standing to challenge an agency‘s compliance with the RFA in the first
place. At least one court has limited the right to sue an agency for failing
to comply with the RFA‘s initial regulatory flexibility analysis requirement
to small businesses that would be affected by the final agency action.79
III. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL
AND SMALL BUSINESS ACTIVITY
Understanding the unique characteristics of entrepreneurs and small
businesses is a critical first step toward developing a more productive
relationship with administrative agencies that administer the RFA.
Acknowledging these strengths and weaknesses, and paying special
attention to how they differ from larger firms with which legislators and
regulators may be more familiar, informs the discussion in two ways. First
and most importantly, it allows commentators to bridge the gap between
theory and practice in developing workable solutions for entrepreneurs and

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
215 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 80.
Id. at 79.
Phelps, supra note 53, at 134.
Id.
Nat‘l Tel. Coop. Ass‘n v. F.C.C., 563 F.3d 536, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Williams Alaska Petrol. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 789, 801 (2003).
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small firms. In addition, understanding the needs of this constituency helps
legislators and regulators meet those needs most effectively.
Entrepreneurs are faced with unique and difficult challenges. They
need to acquire capital from investors or loans from banks. They must also
focus on making their vision for their product or service a reality.
Entrepreneurs also have a brand to develop. Growing brand equity can be
a costly process, especially when larger competitors have already
established brands that are well entrenched in the minds of consumers.
Furthermore, so many vehicles for advertising exist that it is difficult for
the entrepreneur to break through the chatter and reach potential customers.
Entrepreneurs lack the dedicated staff to focus on specific functional areas.
The entrepreneur must be financier, personnel manager, accountant,
technologist, and marketer for the company‘s operations. The need for an
entrepreneur to manage such divergent disciplines inevitably implies that
each functional area will not receive its due attention relative to larger
businesses. It also means that each functional area will not benefit from the
level of expertise that a dedicated practitioner in the field can bring. The
entrepreneur must too often be all things to all people, and as the proverb
goes, the jack-of-all-trades is sometimes the master of none.
A.

The Unique Perception of Small Business toward Risk-Taking and
Political Activity

While it is not entirely clear from available research, small businesses
appear to represent a large portion of the U.S. economy.80 Yet, it appears to
80. Prevailing statistics claim that the economic influence that small businesses assert is
almost overwhelming. According to the SBA, small businesses represent 99.7% of all
employer firms, employ just over half of all private sector employees, pay forty-four percent
of the total U.S. private payroll, generate sixty-four percent of new jobs (over the past
fifteen years), produce thirteen times more patents than large patenting firms, and generate
more than half of the non-farm private gross domestic product. How important are small
businesses to the U.S. economy?, SBA, OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, available at
http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/7495/8420 (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). The 99.7% figure
alone has been cited repeatedly in the academic literature in a variety of contexts. See, e.g.,
David A. Domina, The Debilitating Effects of Concentration Markets Affecting Agriculture,
15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61, 77 (2010) (discussing the economic risks of concentration of
power in too few food producers); David Lourie, Note, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After
the Proposition 8 Campaign, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 165 (2009) (arguing that disclosing the
name of a donor‘s employer presents privacy concerns for donors employed by small
businesses); Dexter K. Case & Jennifer R. Alderfer, BAPCPA and the New Provisions
Relating to Small Businesses, 15 WIDENER L.J. 585, 585 (2006) (discussing reorganization
options of small businesses under BAPCPA); Steven H. Hobbs & Fay Wilson Hobbs,
Family Business and the Business of Families: A Consideration of the Role of the Lawyer, 4
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 153, 156 (1998) (discussing the uniqueness of family owned small
businesses, as relates to law services). The statistics are also cited in research specifically
discussing the RFA. See, e.g., Holman, supra note 1, at 1120–21. Yet these statistics are
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be the study of the individual entrepreneur that generates greater scholarly
inquiry in business research.81 Although entrepreneurs and small business
owners are not identical in nature,82 there is considerable overlap between
the two.83 The important distinction for purposes of this paper is between
businesses that are able to benefit from the reviews required by the RFA
and other supportive measures described here, and those that are not.
As seen through the management literature studying entrepreneurs and
small business owners, such individuals have a unique perspective on risk,
market-assessment, and their own business abilities.84 One study of
entrepreneurs found that entrepreneurs are more likely to exhibit
overconfidence than their large-manager counterparts.85 The study also
found greater representativeness in entrepreneurs, defined by the
willingness to generalize about a person or phenomenon based upon on a
few attributes or observations.86 Other studies have found differences in
the entrepreneur‘s need for achievement and tolerance of ambiguity when
compared to large firm managers.87
sharply criticized by David Hirschberg, a statistician and economist who has worked for the
SBA, as not credible and devised to pursue political ends such as stopping health care
reform. David Hirschberg, The Job-Generation Issue and Its Impact on Health Insurance
Policy, 44 CHALLENGE 82 (2001).
81. James W. Carland et al., Differentiating Entrepreneurs from Small Business
Owners: A Conceptualization, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 354, 355 (1984) (stating that
―[a]lthough small business is a significant segment of the American economy, the
entrepreneurial portion of that segment may wield a disproportionate influence. If
entrepreneurship can be viewed as incorporating innovation and growth, the most fertile
ground for management research may be entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial ventures.‖).
82. Wayne H. Stewart, Jr., et al., A Proclivity for Entrepreneurship: A Comparison of
Entrepreneurs, Small Business Owners, and Corporate Managers, 14 J. BUS. VENTURING
189, 204 (1998) (finding that ―[s]mall business owners are less risk oriented and are not as
highly motivated to achieve as are entrepreneurs. Small business owners also lack the same
degree of preference for innovation.‖).
83. Carland et al., supra note 81, at 357. See also Stewart et al., supra note 82, at 191
(stating that ―[a]ccording to the authors, an entrepreneur capitalizes on innovative
combinations of resources for the principal purposes of profit and growth, and uses strategic
management practices. Alternatively, the small business owner operates a business as an
extension of the individual‘s personality to further personal goals and to produce family
income.‖).
84. Mark Simon, Susan M. Houghton & Karl Aquino, Cognitive Biases, Risk
Perception and Venture Formation: How Individuals Decide to Start Companies, 15 J. BUS.
VENTURING 113 (2000); Robert A. Baron, Cognitive Mechanisms in Entrepreneurship: Why
and When Entrepreneurs Think Differently than Other People, 13 J. BUS. VENTURING 275
(1998).
85. Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay B. Barney, Differences between Entrepreneurs and
Managers in Large Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making, 12
J. BUS. VENTURING 9, 22–23 (1997).
86. Id. at 16, 22–23.
87. See, e.g., Thomas M. Begley & David P. Boyd, Psychological Characteristics
Associated with Performance in Entrepreneurial Firms and Smaller Businesses, 2 J. BUS.
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A particularly important characteristic of entrepreneurs and small
business owners that might influence their interaction with the RFA is their
attitude towards risk. There are numerous dimensions of risk in business
activities beyond the political or regulatory risk that is the focus of most
legal scholarship. Financial risk can arise from non-payment by a major
customer or the change in the cost of capital. Changes in unemployment
and national economic strength underlie economic risk. Operational risk
constantly lurks in the breakdown or theft of key manufacturing equipment.
Both academic research and common sense dictate that entrepreneurs
perceive risk differently.
The most obvious conclusion is that
entrepreneurs accept higher levels of risk in both their business decisions
and their careers generally because of the inherently precarious nature of
entrepreneurial activity. Between fifty and seventy-five percent of small
businesses fail within the first five years.88 More than eighty percent of the
businesses that survive the first five years will fail in the subsequent five
years.89 As the risks of new ventures are widely known, the implication for
entrepreneurs is that they have a higher propensity for taking risks.
Whereas a manager of a large company would perceive significant risk and
avoid the activity, the entrepreneur might pursue the venture in spite of the
uncertainty.
Such a conclusion may seem intuitive.
However, predicted
differences in risk propensity for entrepreneurs have not been reproduced
in academic data. As one author recently writes, ―[r]esearch has fairly
consistently shown that entrepreneurs do not differ significantly from other
members of the population in terms of their propensity to take risks.‖90
This conclusion does not necessarily mean that small business owners are
risk neutral. It also does not mean that academic research on this topic
defies common sense. Instead, it may require a closer examination of the
concept of risk and an understanding that reconciles both with the academic
data and our understanding of entrepreneurial behavior.
Instead of perceiving risk and taking on risky activity, entrepreneurs
VENTURING 79 (1987) (examining the prevalence of five psychological traits in a sample of
entrepreneurs); John B. Miner, Norman R. Smith & Jeffrey S. Bracker, Role of
Entrepreneurial Task Motivation in the Growth of Technologically Innovative Firms, 74 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 554, 557–58 (1989) (discussing a task motivation study).
88. John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities
Universe: “Hey the Stars Might Lie but the Numbers Never Do” 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 925
n.225 (2000) (noting five-year failure rate).
89. MICHAEL E. GERBER, THE E-MYTH REVISITED: WHY MOST SMALL BUSINESSES
DON‘T WORK AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (3d ed. 1995).
90. Laura C. Dunham, From Rational to Wise Action: Recasting Our Theories of
Entrepreneurship, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 513, 519 (2010) (citing Murray B. Low, & Ian C.
MacMillan, Entrepreneurship: Past Research and Future Challenges, 14 J. MGMT. 139
(1988)). See also Busenitz & Barney, supra note 85, at 24 (stating that ―most academicians
hold that entrepreneurs do not differ substantially in their risk-taking propensity‖).
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may instead be subjected to various heuristics and biases that cause them to
underestimate the risk of certain activity compared to managers of large
firms.91 As noted earlier, entrepreneurs are more likely to exhibit
overconfidence and representativeness when compared to their larger firm
counterparts.92 Entrepreneurs may also view their situations more
positively than circumstances warrant.93 Because entrepreneurs more
readily generalize from limited experience, they may more likely reach the
conclusion that a decision is less risky than is objectively warranted.
Entrepreneurs are more susceptible to what one article called the ―illusion
of control.‖94 This bias encourages a belief that a given situation can be
mastered even when that situation is beyond that person‘s control to
influence.95
A third intriguing possibility is that in some situations, risk is not
simply overridden for the achievement of some greater objective. Under
this notion, the entrepreneur believes strongly in the normative goodness of
the venture.96 The entrepreneur has a strong desire to solve an important
problem, improve the common good, or achieve a personal goal.97 This
practice does not simply devalue the presence of risk, but rather makes
considerations of risk less important to the decision.98 Thus, the difference
in risk propensity may not be the important difference in behavior, but
rather the way that small businesses perceive and think about risk overall.99
These varying perceptions of risk overall likely influence the
perception of entrepreneurs toward legal, political, and regulatory risk, the
types of risk most relevant to this article. Entrepreneurs and small
businesses typically will not have legal counsel on staff or playing a major
role in daily operations. Thus, legal advice from an inside or outside
lawyer, which can provide important information about the level of legal
risk, can be infrequent or non-existent.
Furthermore, while the
entrepreneur or small business owner is likely trained in the business
aspects of the operation and likely can function as a jack-of-all-trades, it is
unlikely that these owners have received significant legal training as, with

91. Leslie E. Palich & D. Ray Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain
Entrepreneurial Risk Taking: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 J. BUS. VENTURING
425, 434 (1995).
92. Busenitz & Barney, supra note 85, at 22–23.
93. Palich & Bagby, supra note 91, at 427.
94. Simon, Houghton & Aquino, supra note 84, at 118.
95. Id.
96. Dunham, supra note 90, at 519 (―Within the context of entrepreneurial start-up,
normative considerations—e.g., a strong belief in the goodness of the venture‘s purpose . . .
might make considerations of risk less important to the decision.‖).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Busenitz & Barney, supra note 85, at 25.
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the exception of a single course in a business program, it remains a separate
discipline with high entry and temporal costs. Thus, managers and
executives of small businesses are unlikely to have legal experience to
weigh risks or to have resources available to assess that risk effectively.
In addition, legal and regulatory risk is largely invisible. A business‘s
rivals are constantly present through their own strategies to capture market
value. A business‘s supply and other operational costs arise on a regular
basis through receipt of invoices that must be paid. Financial risk is a
constant problem if the business has received a loan from the bank.
Regular payments on debt must be made or the bank will take action
against the business. Customer demands and preferences continually
challenge the business and it must maneuver to produce goods or services
that the customer wants at a certain quality or price point. The failure to do
so will be immediately reflected in periodic receipts as customers look
elsewhere to satisfy demand.
The legal and regulatory environment does not exert a similarly
constant pressure to act. A business that complies with relevant legal rules
is generally left alone. Furthermore, a business that fails to comply with
legal rules is not immediately met with sanction. It is possible, perhaps
tempting, for a business that is reducing costs through regulatory noncompliance to continue that non-compliance indefinitely due to the
perceived unlikelihood of government sanction. This pressure may be
especially significant for small businesses that perceive a competitive
disadvantage compared to larger rivals and also lack sustained contact with
legal counsel to warn of the dangers. Risk-taking small business managers
may find legal compliance a tempting place to cut corners or engage in
technically legal though risky ‗on the borderline‘ behavior.
The lack of pressured presence of the legal environment may not only
encourage legally risky activity, it may also influence the manner and
frequency in which small businesses participate in the political
environment in which decisions about regulation are made. Not only are
the perspectives of small business managers different from their larger
business counterparts, but their choices of participation mode and impact
on the political environment are also different. In the realm of corporate
political activity, firm size remains a significant influence.100 For example,
100. See, e.g., Wendy L. Hansen & Neil J. Mitchell, Disaggregating and Explaining
Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891, 895 (2001) (discussing how corporations‘ donations to PACs and
other charities can be seen as strategic behavior); David M. Hart, Why Do Some Firms
Give? Why Do Some Firms Give a lot?: High-Tech PACs, 1977-1996, 63 J. POL. 1230,
1236–37 (2001) (discussing the benefits to some firms from donations and lobbying over a
twenty year period); Amy J. Hillman, Determinants of Political Strategies in US
Multinationals, 42 BUS. & SOC‘Y 455, 472–73 (2003) (focusing on political strategies of US
multinational corporations in Europe).
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in one study, authors used questionnaires to determine whether the conduct
of small companies differed from their larger brethren in how they engaged
in corporate political activity.101 The study found that medium-sized
companies reported a significantly better success rate in corporate political
activities when compared to smaller companies.102
This finding is not surprising, and supports the notion that firm size
can act as a proxy for the resources available to engage in corporate
political activity. First, size can represent political power of the business.
Larger businesses generate more benefits for various interest groups. More
workers are employed, more customers are served, and more suppliers
generate business from selling goods and services to the larger businesses.
Unintended beneficiaries, such as nearby restaurants and local businesses
that receive the patronage of the large business‘s employees, also gain.
Thus, the political power of the larger firms is not only more significant
due to their size, but also due to the reliance of various stakeholders that
benefit from their activities. More stakeholders mean more voters that can
influence the regulator or legislator to act.103 The result is an amplification
effect that augments the larger firm‘s political power beyond the confines
of its direct operations. Small companies often lack the indirect or direct
political influence to create this amplification effect.
Second, firm size can also indicate the ability for more effective
political engagement.104 A larger business may have specialists on staff
that can monitor pending legislation and react in the most effective fashion
possible. A larger business may also have a dedicated lobbying firm on
staff to advocate on its behalf. These larger businesses may lead or
dominate trade associations that serve to represent the interests of a number
of businesses in an industry. Small companies, on the other hand, lack the
ability to have such dedicated resources ready. Furthermore, their
individual concerns might be devalued when competing with a larger and
more politically savvy business that has competing interests in the
regulatory environment.
Third, firm size can indicate economic impact. When a larger
business suffers from the costs of increased regulation, its ability to provide
jobs in the community and purchase goods from suppliers declines. A firm
that can claim that disagreeable regulations will impact the economic

101. Ronald G. Cook & Dale R. Fox, Resources, Frequency, and Methods: An Analysis
of Small and Medium-Sized Firms’ Public Policy Activities, 39 BUS. & SOC‘Y 94, 98–100
(2000).
102. Id. at 101.
103. Amy Hillman, Gerald D. Keim & Douglas Schuler, Corporate Political Activity: A
Review and Research Agenda, 30 J. MGMT. 837, 839 (2004).
104. See, e.g., Douglas A. Schuler & Kathleen Rehbein, The Filtering Role of the Firm
in Corporate Political Involvement, 36 BUS. & SOC‘Y 116 (1997).
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environment of a locality in a significant way is likely to receive more
attention of government representatives than a smaller firm that cannot
claim such great harm. This may be so even though the per capita injury
may be greater to the smaller firm than the larger one. Larger firms may
also be more motivated not only to contest harmful regulation, but to argue
proactively for a more favorable regulatory environment. These firms may
be able to more effectively capture rents from public policy than their
smaller counterparts.105
Interestingly, one would expect that, given the impediments to success
that small companies face, they would be less active in the political
environment. Yet, Cook and Fox found that small companies were more
active, not less, in corporate political activity than their medium-sized
counterparts.106 Small companies also tackled a wider range of issues.107 In
addition, small companies were more likely to participate in groups than
medium-sized businesses.108 Intriguingly, even though small companies
reported themselves to be more active, they also reported less successful
outcomes when compared to the medium-sized businesses studied.109
These findings can be combined to imply a pattern of corporate
political activity for small businesses. Reports of greater political activity
for smaller firms are surprising, especially given the numerous costs and
impediments to action in place. However, it may be that the quantity of
small business participation, rather than participation quality, is driving the
results. A hypothetical pattern may be the following: small businesses,
through a trade publication, local newsletter, or word-of-mouth, learn of
regulation that is unfavorable. Through their shared contacts or a formal
network, these businesses contact their relevant government
representatives. The businesses are not highly sophisticated politically, nor
are they coordinated, so scattered protests reach the regulator in a relatively
disorganized fashion.110 Perhaps each small business writes about its own
situation, giving only a micro-view of the impact of the questionable rule.
Businesses might also focus on their own harm, resulting in arguments that
vary in form, or even directly contradict their fellow small business owners
seeking to change the rule.111 Legislators faced with pressure from various
105. Hillman, Keim & Schuler, supra note 103, at 839.
106. Cook & Fox, supra note 101, at 106-07.
107. Id. at 107.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The study found that, with the exception of a negative effect of letter writing
campaigns, there was no apparent ―‗silver bullet,‘ a method or combination of methods that
was clearly a winner.‖ Id. at 108.
111. Ronald G. Cook & David Barry, Shaping the External Environment: A Study of
Small Firms’ Attempts to Influence Public Policy, 34 BUS. & SOC‘Y 317, 319 (1995)
[hereinafter Shaping the External Environment] (stating that ―[p]olicy makers accustomed to
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groups or regulators tasked with a potentially aggressive mandate might
discount the combined campaign because of its relative lack of unity and
professionalism. There may also be the presence of influence fatigue due
to the repeated challenges of these smaller businesses. The first campaign
by small companies to reverse a rule might provoke attention. The tenth
campaign in a relatively short period of time, by contrast, might have a
diluted effect on the targeted agency or legislator. As a result, the more
frequent and coordinated efforts by unsophisticated small businesses to
engage in corporate political activity might produce less beneficial results
than a more sophisticated larger business that understands how to lobby
most efficiently and tactically for the greatest benefit. The above scenario
is merely a hypothetical, but may clarify at least in part the motivations for
small firm activity and provide an explanation for the less productive
results.
B.

The Pressures of the Regulatory Environment

This cross-disciplinary pressure inevitably influences how
entrepreneurs interact with their regulatory environment. At best, a
business owner will give legal rules the same scattered treatment provided
to business functions. The entrepreneur might learn just enough about
trademark law to develop an initial company logo. The entrepreneur might
follow the necessary steps to form a corporation, but neglect the corporate
form once the business is underway. If the entrepreneur interacts with
regulators, the entrepreneur may only consider that interaction to the extent
that regulators will leave the entrepreneur alone in the future. The
entrepreneur may never again choose to interact with government officials
except when required to do so. Given the constant pressures of running a
business, dedicating time and effort to voluntary interaction with the
regulatory environment is readily seen as an unwise use of limited
resources.
Yet small business owners face significant and persistent pressures
from the regulatory environment.112 The most obvious pressure that small
businesses face is the cost of complying with regulations. Some variable
costs might impose a similar percentage burden when compared to larger
firms. If a regulation requires a certain safety feature on a product, for

dealing with the high-powered, smoothly orchestrated, and well-financed influence
campaigns of large companies are likely to have difficulty making sense of and responding
to the multi-faceted, loosely joined, and often-conflicted voices of small business owners.‖).
112. See Ronald G. Cook & David Barry, When Should the Small Firm be Involved in
Public Policy?, 31 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 39, 39 (1993) [hereinafter When Should Firms be
Involved] (stating that ―[i]n many industries, the political success of a business is no less
important than marketplace success‖).
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example, that feature is an added cost that increases or decreases according
to the quantity of production.
However, many regulatory costs are fixed costs that disproportionately
burden small businesses.113 Firms handling a certain dangerous substance,
for example, might be required to process, monitor, and store that
substance in a similar fashion, regardless of the quantity of the substance
used. A large firm might benefit from economies of scale in providing
facilities to store the substance that a small business cannot.
Paperwork might also accompany regulatory compliance.
If
paperwork requirements are the same regardless of a firm‘s size, then the
cost of obtaining the information, keeping the necessary records and
submitting those records to the appropriate agency may burden the small
business more when compared to its larger competitor. The economies of
scale from paperwork requirements can be significant; an advantage which
small businesses cannot easily exploit.114 Thus, the problem for small firms
is both efficiency and effectiveness. Small firms will not have the internal
regulatory systems in place to process paperwork as efficiently as large
ones. Small firms will also not know enough about the regulatory
environment to be as effective at compliance when compared to their larger
brethren. Furthermore, regulatory burdens in a small business can tax the
resources of the very person whose attention is necessary elsewhere—the
chief executive.115 Larger firms can delegate regulatory issues to
specialists. An entrepreneur may not have that luxury available, or it may
come at a very high price. Time spent managing regulatory problems is
seen as time lost to developing one‘s product or service. This zero-sum
loss approach to regulation gives a strong incentive to avoid regulatory
issues as much as possible.
Small firms may also present more tempting targets because of their
lack of resources. If a small business is detected and prosecuted, it might
be less likely to mount a successful defense against the prosecuting agency.
Large businesses, by contrast, might be able to afford sophisticated and
specialized legal counsel and dedicate significant funds to the defense.
Entrepreneurs in particular might face special scrutiny. Although
many innovations represent reasonable extensions of current knowledge,
some may be so unusual or radical that they might create a new category of
product or service altogether. A radically new phenomenon based upon
entrepreneurial activity might not easily fall within an agency‘s regulatory
scrutiny. This might give the entrepreneur freedom for a time, but
113. Paul Sommers & Roland J. Cole, Costs of Compliance in Small and Medium-Sized
Businesses, 6 AM. J. SMALL BUS. 25, 26 (1981).
114. WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S. EVANS, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESS 136
(1986).
115. Sommers & Cole, supra note 113, at 26.
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regulatory controls will inevitably apply to the business. When the law
finally catches up to the business, regulatory scrutiny might be more
searching or comprehensive than that practiced in established fields. A
good example of this phenomenon might be the introduction of websites
such as Facebook or Twitter. In very little time, entrepreneurs created an
entirely new web industry based upon social networking. Initially the
target of few specialized regulations, increased attention from news media
has brought great public scrutiny. The result has been legislators and
regulators who struggle to catch up with the advances of the industry.116
Not all of the costs involved with regulation, however, necessarily fall
hardest upon the smallest firms. Consider the perspective of a regulator
with a broad mandate and limited budget. This regulator wants to further
the mandate as much as possible within the confines of available funds.
The regulator is a kind of entrepreneur in her own right, using her
discretion to maximize regulatory returns relative to costs.
Given a regulator‘s incentives and limitations, small businesses may
be the least interesting target for regulatory scrutiny. Small businesses tend
to have the smallest non-compliance issues in absolute terms. For example,
assume that a small business fails to remediate pollution emissions that are
thirty percent over the maximum, due to inadequate controls. This business
might be a less attractive target than a business many times its size who
fails to remediate by only ten percent. However, it is the much larger
business that, in absolute terms, may release more harmful pollutants into
the air. If the regulator‘s goal is to reduce as many illegal pollutants as
possible, then the larger business is the optimal target, even though the
small business might be a more flagrant violator. Small businesses might
be able to get away with more brazen violations because the absolute value
of the damage remains diminished.
Small businesses also may be more difficult to detect and isolate.117 In
an industry that might have hundreds, if not thousands, of small businesses,
the new venture that skirts regulatory standards might easily be overlooked
amongst the sheer number of rival enterprises. A small business that has an
otherwise clean slate can readily blend into the regulatory scenery and
ignore scrutiny even after repeated violations.
Small firms may also not be ideal public relations targets. Agencies

116. See, e.g., Daniel B. Garrie et al., Data Protection: The Challenges Facing Social
Networking, 6 B.Y.U. INT‘L L. & MGMT. REV. 127, 128 (2010) (noting in a global context
that, ―[a]s social networking technology has raced forward, it has left corresponding
legislation in the dust. . . . [D]ata protection laws have remained sorely inadequate to protect
personal information in the social networking environment.‖); Lisa Thomas & Robert
Newman, Social Networking and Blogging: The New Legal Frontier, 9 J. MARSHALL
INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. 500 (2009).
117. Sommers & Cole, supra note 113, at 26.

BIRD & BROWNFINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE)

860

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/26/2011 10:51 AM

[Vol. 13:4

have limited budgets and are subject to the will of the legislative entity that
funds them. Savvy regulators might respond to such pressures by
enforcing rules against the most visible or notoriously-perceived violators
rather than those firms that are actually committing the greatest harm.
State regulators, for example, might have an incentive to challenge
companies with only a token state presence relative to their broader
operations.
Small businesses by contrast, are rarely so visible or notorious that
they would generate public relations rewards for the agency that scrutinizes
them. These small businesses are also more likely to be able to assert that
most or all of the jobs they offer are located within a particular state. The
implication is that those in-state jobs would be threatened if legal action
commences against them. A small business entrepreneur might even make
a more sympathetic figure. He can present himself as a ‗regular guy‘ who
is just trying to get ahead in a big business world and who is unfairly
scrutinized by a massive government bureaucracy.
C.

Attitudes of Small Business Owners Toward Regulation

Small business owners have expressed significant concerns about the
impact of regulation on their business operations. A survey of nearly two
hundred small business owners in the Midwest revealed that 81.1%
believed regulatory compliance indirectly added costs to their business and
66.3% believed that regulations added direct costs to their product.118 A
majority of owners (65.3%) believed that government regulation impedes
the progress of their business overall.119 Approximately half of respondents
reported that government regulation impacts their motivation to continue as
a small business owner.120 While a majority of respondents reported no
contact with public officials, those that did reported both positive and
negative experiences.121 Median annual compliance costs to regulation
were estimated at $2500, representing between five and ten percent of sales
for most of the sampled companies.122 These numbers appear to be selfreported123 and may represent a tendency toward inflated estimates of the
costs of regulation.124 However, it is no less important to note that at least
118. Donald F. Kuratko, Jeffrey S. Hornsby & Douglas W. Naffziger, The Adverse
Impact of Public Policy on Microenterprises: An Exploratory Study of Owners’ Perceptions,
4 J. DEVELOPMENTAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 81, 86 (1999).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 86–87.
121. Id. at 88.
122. Id. at 81.
123. Id. at 88. The information was obtained as a part of a thirty-six item questionnaire.
Id. at 85.
124. This overreaction has been observed in various business-related fields. See Robert
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the perception of small business owners is that regulation is a significant
impediment to efficient operations.
Because small business owners are often already overtaxed and find
themselves facing an already complex legal environment, their negative
reactions to further regulatory constraints is not surprising. What is
perhaps unexpected is how strongly these negative attitudes resonate and
how vast the gulf between a regulator and small business leader might be.
Cook and Barry conducted thirty-one interviews with small business
executives across an array of industries to learn about their attitudes toward
regulation and regulators.125 Transcripts were produced from interviews
with these executives, who led companies ranging from eighteen to 380
employees, all located in upstate New York.126 The transcripts yielded
hundreds of pages of data.127
The results were unequivocal and striking. The authors explained
that, ―[f]rom the first interview to the last, it was apparent that small
business Chief Executive Officers (―CEOs‖) considered the public policy
arena extremely confusing and complex.‖128 Executives would often
describe regulations as ―clear as mud‖ or ask, ―Where did this come from?‖
and conclude that regulation was not based on reality.129
Executives viewed themselves not as participants in an unpleasant but
necessary regulatory regime, but as soldiers in a long-standing war against
the government.130 This war was ―filled with turf disputes, shootouts,
fierce battle campaigns, serious injuries, dashed hopes, and occasional tales

C. Bird & John D. Knopf, Do Disability Laws Impair Firm Performance?, 47 AM. BUS. L.J.
145 (2010) (finding a surprisingly large change in fixed asset purchases by firms when a
state adopted a disability accommodation requirement into its state law); Stephen J. Choi,
The Unfounded Fear of Regulation S: Empirical Evidence on Offshore Securities Offerings,
50 DUKE L.J. 663 (2000) (providing empirical evidence regarding the risks of security
regulation compared to inflated market reactions); Lauren B. Edelman, Steven E. Abraham
& Howard S. Erlanger, Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful
Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 47, 80 (1992) (finding that ―there seems to be significant
albeit not conclusive evidence that employers‘ responses to wrongful discharge doctrine are
in large part a result of constructions of the legal environment by the personnel and legal
professions, which significantly overstate the risks of wrongful discharge doctrine to
employers.‖); Michael D. Weiss, Note, The Poor Tax Revisited: The Effects of Shifting the
Burden of Investigating Drug Crimes to Lenders, 70 TEX. L. REV. 717, 722 (1992) (noting
that banks will likely overreact to regulation involving government seizure of illicit monies
because of their inherent aversion to risk).
125. Shaping the External Environment, supra note 111, at 322.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 324–25.
129. Id. at 325.
130. Id. at 325–26. The military metaphor, the authors write, was ―the most commonly
used method of organizing and making sense of public policy information.‖ Id. at 326.
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of victory.‖131 This attitude may influence why lobbyists hired by
businesses are commonly known as ―hired guns.‖132
An attitude of despair and frustration also permeated the interviews.
CEOs are typically confident by nature,133 but these interviews revealed
leaders who were hesitant and uncertain about influencing the regulatory
environment.134 CEO interviews were often punctuated with remarks like
―small firms never win.‖135 One executive even lamented about being
―very damn discouraged . . . [and] frankly . . . ready to throw in the towel,‖
over what he perceived as frivolous legal rules.136 Interviewees generally
believed that government policies had such a strong influence that they
could be responsible for the long-term failure of the organization.137 Such
responses reveal that regulation was a most uncomfortable and emotional
subject for the interviewed subjects.
Little good can come from such strongly negative and emotional
responses, and this attitude permeated the decision making process of the
organization. Some firms ―defended‖ themselves against regulatory
encroachment by avoiding compliance, denying non-compliance had
occurred when challenged, and hoping to be overlooked due to sheer
numbers.138 Even fewer viewed the relationship with government as a
potentially ―win/win‖ relationship.139 Instead, government officials were
perceived as the ―town bad guys‖ whom executives could never ―run out of
town.‖140 Businesses tended only to react when regulations had already
made extensive inroads into company operations.141
Predictably, the interviews showed that meetings with regulators were
unproductive. These meetings widened rather than reduced rifts between

131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based,
Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 527 (2007) (using the term); Ron
Smith, Compelled Cost Disclosure of Grass Roots Lobbying Expenses: Necessary
Government Voyeurism or Chilled Political Speech?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 115, 132
(1996) (using the term).
133. James R. Hines, Jr., Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1192 (2010) (noting for the
purpose of distinguishing between for-profit and non-for-profit leaders that, ―[o]wners and
executives of for-profit firms generally receive performance-based compensation, which
both motivates high levels of attention and effort and attracts managers who are confident in
their capabilities.‖).
134. Shaping the External Environment, supra note 111, at 326.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 328.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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regulators and business owners.142 Regulators and businesspeople met only
when one side wanted something from the other. This encouraged a
defensive rather than a collaborative posture,143 whereby each side secondguessed the other and avoided concessions. These meetings yielded few
productive results. Overall, CEOs surveyed in the study exhibited strongly
negative attitudes toward regulation.
The attitudes expressed in this study differ significantly from the more
moderate responses found by Kuratko and co-authors.144 Thus, the
methodology of the CEO study is worth noting because it may have
influenced its finding of graphic results. Unlike the prior work, which used
questionnaires,145 this study used in-depth interviews of thirty-one
executives from twenty-seven firms lasting approximately ninety minutes
each.146 The authors also observed nine trade association meetings having
a government relations focus.147 Also unlike the prior work, this paper
focused primarily on attempts by executives to influence the public policy
process. These lengthy interviews may have provided a sense of comfort to
the interviewees, allowing them to express themselves more freely to the
interviewer and voice problems with the business. Trade association
meetings that were observed may have had a similar effect. The
immoderate responses may also be a product of overall frustration as much
as specific problems with regulation.
Justified or not, the belligerent attitude of these business leaders likely
exacerbates the problem of unwanted regulatory influence even further.
Indeed, their behavior may encourage the very regulatory environment they
want so strongly to prevent. It is possible that policy makers, presumably
already suspicious of business motives, engaged in defensive behaviors of
their own. One strategy, the authors of the study surmise, is that
policymakers kept legislative language deliberately obtuse in order to avoid
clear impact calculations that businesses could use to defeat or repeal the
legislation.148 It is questionable whether obtuseness in legislative language
arose solely or even primarily from defensive motives. Among the many
reasons might be that the written word is simply an insufficient medium for

142. Id. at 326.
143. See Tia Henderson, The Foundation to Collaborate: Understanding the Role of
Participant Interests 325 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Portland State University)
(stating that ―when people are mistrustful, they engage in defensive behavior that
encourages positions and distributive tactics.‖ (citing DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION
BEHAVIOR (1981)))
144. Kuratko, Hornsby & Naffziger, supra note 118.
145. Id.
146. Shaping the External Environment, supra note 111, at 322.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 327.

BIRD & BROWNFINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE)

864

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/26/2011 10:51 AM

[Vol. 13:4

legislators to ever draft a statute that is perfectly unambiguous.149
However, the point behind this conclusion is an important one. Policy
makers and regulators may react negatively or positively depending on the
posture of the regulated parties.
Further aggravating the problem is lack of notice or interest for
government programs designed to aid small businesses or alleviate the
regulatory burden. When government agencies offer programs to assist or
support small enterprises, they often become invisible to these entities. In
one study, the author examined the effectiveness of government export
assistance programs for businesses and discovered a general lack of
awareness that such programs even existed.150 Another study reported a
similar lack of awareness of technology transfer assistance programs
available to local manufacturers.151 When small firms learn of such
programs, they often view these programs with suspicion rather than
appreciation. An investigation of business-owner attitudes towards
government involvement on a range of issues revealed that small business
owners were largely unconvinced that government could deliver on
promised assistance.152 Almost half of small business owners surveyed
believed that government should not be involved in job creation.
Ultimately, most CEOs of small businesses did not even consider
involving themselves in a public policy issue until that issue directly
impacted their businesses.153 Overall, few small business owners surveyed
took an active role in the public policy arena.154 When these few owners
attempted to influence public policy makers to promote more businessfriendly policies, these efforts usually failed.155 It is little wonder why
small business owners are so frustrated with what they perceive as an
oppressive, inexplicable, and hostile regulatory climate in the United
States.
149. Jonathan D. Andrews, Reconciling the Split: Affording Reasonable Accommodation
to Employees: “Regarded As” Disabled Under the ADA—An Exercise in Statutory
Interpretation, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 977, 994 (2006) (stating that ―[l]atent statutory
ambiguities can arise any time after drafting. The English language is far too complex for
legislators to draft a perfectly unambiguous statute; not to mention the fact that the
meanings of words change over time.‖).
150. A.H. Moini, Small Firms Exporting: How Effective are Government Export
Assistance Programs?, 36 J. SM. BUS. MGMT. 1, 1 (1998).
151. John Masten, G. Bruce Hartman, & Arief Safari, Small Business Strategic Planning
and Technology Transfer: The Use of Publicly Supported Technology Assistance Agencies,
33 J. SM. BUS. MGMT. 26, 26 (1995).
152. Kelly C. Strong & Michael Winchell, A Comparison of Small and Large Business
Managers’ Attitudes Toward Innovation and the Role of Government in Promoting
Technology, 6 J. SM. BUS. STRATEGY 109, 119 (1995).
153. Shaping the External Environment, supra note 111, at 329.
154. Id. at 328.
155. Id. at 326.
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IV. STRATEGIES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES IN NAVIGATING THE RFA
Learning to think strategically over the long term in a way that is both
realistic and effective is a crucial skill for small businesses. The most
competitive small businesses will acknowledge the need to take regulations
into account as a business concern, in the same way that they acknowledge
other issues that may be beyond their expertise, but which significantly
affect their chances of success.
While the RFA mandates some amount of agency attentiveness to
small business‘ concerns, its limitations have been well documented, as
described above. In order to increase transparency and improve real-time
communication between small firms and agencies throughout the
rulemaking process, small firms must have a stronger voice in the
rulemaking process. The SBA plays some role in training and policing the
agencies in small firm sensitivity, but small firms can and should also take
the issue of maximizing RFA benefits into their own hands. They can do
so both directly (in terms of specific exemptions and adjustments to
regulations) and indirectly (in terms of improved long-term relationships
with relevant agencies).
But how can these small businesses better communicate their interests
to relevant agencies, when so many of them are already under enormous
financial pressure simply to turn a profit? Often these small businesses will
put regulatory matters at the bottom of their priority list. There are several
ways for small businesses to contribute meaningfully to that process, rather
than coming to the table too late to effect change. These contributions
include taking advantage of technological advances and federal imperatives
to improve the accessibility of the rulemaking process as well as finding
strength in numbers through trade associations and other means. These
strategies can help improve the substantive dialogue between agencies and
firms, creating or strengthening the working relationship between them
and, presumably, leading to a more nuanced appreciation of small firm
concerns in the rulemaking process. We will next describe some of the
most promising routes for small firms to take.
A.

Make Strategic Use of the Online Open Government Initiatives.

Small businesses can benefit from recent mandates compelling federal
agencies to increase opportunities for public participation in the rulemaking
process. These mandates require agencies to take several steps that have
ancillary benefits for small businesses. For example, because agencies are
now required to put their information online in a searchable format, small
businesses are better able to find information about, and give feedback on,
potential rules that may affect their operations during the rulemaking
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process. While these increased transparency mandates are designed to
benefit the public in general, small businesses can use the resulting flow of
information competitively to reap greater and more concrete benefits than
other stakeholders.
One of President Obama‘s first actions upon taking office was to
direct federal agencies to make better and more extensive use of the
internet in order to improve transparency, participation and collaboration in
agency action.156 An Open Government Directive (―Directive‖) issued in
December 2009 provided more detailed instructions to agencies about
implementing these standards.157 A comprehensive overview of the results
of the Open Government Initiative, as it is called, was established through
the White House website.158 This website features an ―Innovations
Gallery‖ that showcases some of what the Administration considers the
most outstanding ways in which agencies have improved transparency,
participation and collaboration.
The Open Government Initiative increases the potential for small firm
interaction with government agencies in several ways. For example, the
Directive required agencies to ―publish information online in an open
format that can be retrieved, downloaded, indexed and searched by
commonly used web search applications.‖159 The Directive also ordered
each federal agency to develop a comprehensive Open Government Plan to
meet the terms of the President‘s mandate by April 2010. The Open
Government Plans were also to include ―[d]etails as to how your agency is
complying with transparency initiative guidance such as . . . eRulemaking .
. . .‖160 They were also required to include ―descriptions of and links to
appropriate websites where the public can engage in existing participatory
processes of your agency‖ and ―proposals for new feedback mechanisms,
including innovative tools and practices that create new and easier methods
for public engagement.‖161 Through these requirements, agencies were
compelled both to make it easier for stakeholders to find existing ways of
engaging in agency processes, such as rulemaking, and to expand the
opportunities for such engagement.
The Directive further required each agency to create an ―Open
Government Webpage‖ on their agency‘s website, to be maintained and
updated ―in a timely fashion.‖162 Each Open Government Webpage was to
156. Memorandum from President Barack Obama, supra note 6.
157. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 7.
158. Open Government Initiative, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/open
(last visited Feb. 1, 2011). The site‘s Open Gov Blog serves as a news feed to highlight
agency improvements and awards that further the Open Government Initiative‘s goals.
159. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 7, at 2.
160. Id. at 8.
161. Id. at 9.
162. Id. at 2.
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―incorporate a mechanism for the public to: i. Give feedback on and
assessment of the quality of published information; ii. Provide input about
which information to prioritize for publication; and iii. Provide input on the
agency‘s Open Government Plan.‖163
The Open Government Initiative bodes well for small businesses. The
new opportunities for public input, once developed and implemented by the
agencies, offer small firms another means of communicating with agencies
about their interests and increase accessibility to those agencies. They
require agencies to create new ways for both the small businesses they
regulate as well as the general public to voice concerns about proposed or
existing regulations, even if the agencies do not ultimately act on those
concerns.
Small firms can use these initiatives to their advantage in several
specific ways. For example, a small firm might periodically perform a
search of an agency‘s website to determine whether there are any proposed
regulations relevant to its business. Prior to the Directive, a small firm had
no assurance that any of an agency‘s proposed rules and any related agency
discussions would be searchable online, let alone all of them. Before the
release of Open Government Plans, small firms might not have known
what participatory processes an agency offered in the first place. Small
firms now have much greater opportunities to (1) find out how to interact
with agencies, (2) take part in developing new means of interacting with
agencies, and (3) learn what substantive matters potentially affecting their
businesses are on the table for possible regulatory action by the agencies
that affect them the most.
B.

Engage Agencies Through Social Media and Dedicated Websites.

Small firms can also use social media to interact with agencies to an
extent that was unimaginable even ten years ago, let alone in 1980 when
the RFA was passed. According to a recent GAO report, twenty-two of the
twenty-four major federal agencies had a presence on Facebook, YouTube
and/or Twitter.164 Agencies also use blogs, wikis, podcasts and mashups to
convey information about agency activity.165
Similarly, most small firms have some presence on the internet.
According to the Small Business Success Index published by Network

163. Id. at 3. Each agency is also directed to ―respond to public input received on its
Open Government Webpage on a regular basis.‖ Id. The vagueness inherent in the terms
―respond‖ and ―regular‖ do not provide small firms with as much assurance of a timely and
substantive response as supporters of small firm interests might want.
164. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-872T, CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL
AGENCIES‘ USE OF WEB 2.0 TECHNOLOGIES (2010).
165. Id. at 4.
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Solutions, LLC and the University of Maryland‘s Smith School of
Business, sixty-seven percent of small firms surveyed either have a website
or plan to have one within two years, and twenty-four percent of small
firms surveyed already use social media.166 At the very least, most small
business owners have an email account and the ability to interact online.
Using the internet, and social media in particular, to communicate with
federal agencies offers the potential of streamlining and facilitating
interaction in a way that benefits both the regulators and the regulated.
Some of this interaction is happening already. The SBA received an
enthusiastic response when it started using social media. The SBA‘s
Facebook pages and Twitter feeds for its regional offices were activated in
the third week of December 2010. Two weeks later, there were over 2500
followers on the agency‘s Twitter account, and close to 5000 ―Likes‖ on
their Facebook page.167
Another underused innovation supporting the goals of the RFA is the
Regulations.gov website. This website, part of the eRulemaking initiative,
allows users to ―[s]earch for‖ and access ―a proposed rule, final rule or
Federal Register (FR) notice,‖ ―[s]ubmit a comment on a regulation or on
another comment,‖ ―[s]ign up for e-mail alerts about a specific regulation‖
and ―[s]ubscribe to RSS feeds by agency of newly posted FR notices.‖168
The site provides access to information from nearly 300 federal agencies.
While the Directive does encourage agency responsiveness to small
firms and other stakeholders who benefit from increased transparency and
communication, its potential benefits are greatest when a small firm can
target the specific agency or agencies that most directly affect its
operations. The Regulations.gov website, in contrast, allows public
searches of proposed and current regulations from all major government
agencies. As the website explains,
In the past, if members of the public were interested in
commenting on a regulation, they would have to know the
sponsoring agency, when it would be published, review it in a

166. Rockbridge Assoc., The State of Small Business Report: June 2010 Survey of Small
Business
Success,
NETWORK
SOLUTIONS
2
(July
2010),
http://www.networksolutions.com/smallbusiness/wpcontent/files/Network_Solutions_Small_Business_Success_Index.pdf.
167. Jen Williams, The Small Business Administration Engages Social Media, PRONET
ADVERTISING (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.pronetadvertising.com/articles/the-small-businessadministration-engages-social-media.html.
168. About Us, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!aboutUs (last visited
Feb. 2, 2011). The eRulemaking initiative was established in October 2002, and launched
the Regulations.gov website in 2003 ―to enable citizens to search, view and comment on
regulations issued by the U.S. government.‖ eRulemaking Program, REGULATIONS.GOV,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!aboutProgram (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). The EPA has
served as the managing partner of the eRulemaking program since its inception. Id.
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reading room, then struggle through a comment process specific
to each agency. Today using Regulations.gov, the public can
shape rules and regulations that impact their lives conveniently,
from anywhere.169
Using this website, small firms can search broadly for proposals that
could affect their operations without limiting themselves to specific
agencies, which could be especially advantageous for small firms that
know relatively little about the rulemaking process and/or the federal
agencies most likely to regulate their specific operation.
As part of the Open Government Initiative, the Regulations.gov
website was retooled to create the Regulations.gov Exchange, which
explicitly invites public comment and participation in the rulemaking
process and on improvements to the Regulations.gov website itself. For
example, one well-received proposal was the organization of regulatory
information by regulatory category, such as Defense, Energy, Environment
or Health Care. The site notes that an advantage to such an organizational
scheme would be that ―rulemakings of federal agencies [would]
become more compatible with commonly used media categories,
providing real-world perspectives about rules.‖ 170 An unusual feature
of the Regulations.gov Exchange (unusual, at least, for a government
website) is the star-rating feature that allows users to evaluate the
usefulness of the site‘s features.171
While most agency usage of social media is designed to stream
information one way—from the agency to the general public, thus
ostensibly meeting the goal of transparency—social media offers small
firms a valuable new way to convey their concerns and interests back to the
agencies whose regulations can affect every aspect of their operations.
C.

Leverage the Lobbying Power of Trade Associations.

Trade associations have enormous potential to help small businesses
make their best strategic use of the RFA. Trade associations are
professional groups that bring firm representatives together to share
information and concerns about their industry. They often act on behalf of
an industry group to promote the association members‘ interests to the

169. eRulemaking
Program,
REGULATIONS.GOV,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!aboutProgram (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
170. Regulated
Sector
Categories,
REGULATIONS.GOV,
http://www.regulations.gov/exchange/topic/exchange/discussion/regulated-sector-categories
(last visited April 8, 2011).
171. See,
e.g.,
Exchange
Discussions,
REGULATIONS.GOV,
http://www.regulations.gov/exchange/topic/exchange (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (allowing
users to evaluate the usefulness of the site‘s features through a star-rating feature).
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government at the federal and/or state level. With a centralized
communication channel to small firms in a particular industry already in
place, trade associations could serve as a critical point of contact for
agencies seeking input from the smaller firms in a given industry.
Two kinds of trade associations exist to help small businesses. The
first are industry-specific associations, which offer benefits to both large
and small firms within a given industry. The second are trade associations
that operate to help meet the needs of small firms in general. These
include the National Small Business Association (NSBA), the National
Association of Women Business Owners (NAWBO), which assists women
entrepreneurs, and the National Federation of Independent Businesses
(NFIB), the largest lobbying organization for small businesses in the
country. Small firms can make strategic use of both kinds of associations.
One of the most common ways for small businesses to leverage the
power of trade associations has been through litigation. Trade associations
have taken the lead in several lawsuits challenging new regulations because
the promulgating agency failed to comply with the RFA requirements. In
one case, the International Franchise Association and a number of other
national trade associations succeeded in getting a Northern District of
California court to enjoin the Department of Homeland Security‘s ―nomatch‖ rule, which prohibited employers from hiring or retaining workers
whose names did not match their Social Security number records. Their
complaint alleged that the federal government did not assess the impact of
this rule on small businesses as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
nor did it prove that there was no less burdensome alternative available.172
After nearly two years of litigation, the Department of Homeland Security
eventually rescinded the rule.173
While trade associations have great potential to help small businesses
communicate with regulators, they may bring disadvantages as well. One
potential obstacle to the use of trade associations is the perception that they
are deaf to the concerns of small businesses. In some industries, small
businesses have been reluctant to engage in trade association activity
because they believe that larger businesses, with the capacity to devote
greater resources to funding and leading such associations, dominate or
distort the agenda. While some commentators have pointed out that trade
associations are often dominated by large companies, leaving the concerns
of small businesses underrepresented,174 this is not always the case. In any
event, there is far less risk that a large business will dominate a trade
172. David French, IFA and Industry Groups Sue to Stop “No-Match” Rule: Firing
Workers Required Under Immigration “No-Match” Rule, FRANCHISING WORLD, Oct. 2007,
at 39.
173. 74 FED. REG. 51, 447 (OCT. 7, 2009).
174. Holman, supra note 1, at 1124.
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association‘s lobbying agenda for trade associations specializing in the
interests of small firms, such as the NSBA. The NSBA, for example, only
gives voting rights to small firm members.175
D.

Voice Concerns Through the R3 Process.

One of the easiest ways for small firms to register concerns about
particular laws is to take advantage of the Regulatory Review & Reform
Initiative, also known as the r3 process. Through this annual process, the
SBA‘s Office of Advocacy invites small firms to single out regulations for
review and possible revision. As part of the process, the Office of
Advocacy solicits suggestions from small businesses at the end of every
calendar year. A few months later, the Office publishes the ―Top Ten
Rules for Review and Reform.‖ In order to track agency progress in
reviewing these rules, the Office posts an update on their status every six
months.176 The Office of Advocacy has described the r3 process as ―a tool
for small business stakeholders‖ to help ―identify and address existing
federal regulations that should be revised because they are ineffective,
duplicative, or out of date.‖177 The r3 process is not just a vehicle for
complaints. It also allows small businesses to engage more creatively with
the government by suggesting positive regulatory reforms.
Despite the visibility and responsiveness of the r3 process, relatively
few small firms have taken advantage of it. The 2009 ―Top Ten Rules for
Review and Reform‖ were chosen from a field of only thirty-eight
nominations, fewer than half of the eighty nominations that the SBA
received in 2008.178 While it is not clear why more small firms do not take
advantage of this process, it is likely that many simply do not know about
it. Given the attitudes of small firms discussed in Part III above, it is also
possible that many small firms lack the information they would need to
175. While the NSBA technically accepts businesses of any size as members, only those
members with 500 or fewer employees are allowed to vote on issues, according to Patrick
Post, its Vice President of Membership. Mr. Post notes that 98% of the NSBA‘s members
have 15 or fewer employees, and 37% have 5 or fewer employees. Interview with Patrick
Post, Vice President of NSBA Membership (Dec. 15, 2010).
176. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. Office of Advocacy, Advocacy Commits to
Long-Term r3 Initiative (July 30, 2008), available at http://archive.sba.gov/advo/press/0820.html.
177. Small Business Regulatory Review and Reform Initiative, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF ADVOCACY (Oct. 1, 2010), http://archive.sba.gov/advo/r3/.
178. Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. Office of Advocacy, Two New Regulations
Added to 2009 r3 Top 10 Rules for Review and Reform, (Feb. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/809/12400; Advocacy Commits To Long-Term r3 Initiative,
supra note 176. Low participation rates may have influenced the Office of Advocacy‘s
decision in early 2011 to put the r3 program on temporary hiatus. Telephone conversation
with Charles Maresca, Director of Interagency Operations (Feb. 8, 2011).

BIRD & BROWNFINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE)

872

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

8/26/2011 10:51 AM

[Vol. 13:4

take part in the process, such as the specific name of a regulation affecting
them or the information necessary to suggest an affirmative change. A
third possibility is that some small firms simply do not want to engage with
the SBA at all.
V.

STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE AGENCY RESPONSIVENESS TO SMALL
BUSINESSES

While small businesses can do much to achieve their own goals in
working with regulators, regulators also have new means to help them
achieve the RFA‘s mandate of sensitivity to small businesses‘ concerns.
The original terms of the RFA asked the agencies to take the considerations
of small businesses into account during the rulemaking process, but
provided little direction as to how agencies might learn what the true
constraints and concerns of these businesses were. Federal agencies can
vastly improve their understanding of and responsiveness to small
businesses, as the RFA originally compelled them to do, by adopting some
of the reforms suggested below. None of them require a significant
investment of additional resources, and the potential benefits for both
regulators and the smaller firms that they affect could be tremendous.
A.

Consider Potential Advantages of Adapting State Models.

In an effort to spread the gospel of regulatory flexibility from federal
to state government, the SBA‘s Office of Advocacy first drafted model
legislation for state versions of the RFA in 2002. Since that time,
according to the SBA, ―37 state legislatures have considered regulatory
flexibility legislation, and 22 states have implemented regulatory flexibility
via Executive Order or legislation.‖179 The number of states adopting some
version of a regulatory flexibility law has grown over time.
A closer examination of these state statutes, however, shows a wide
variation in their potential benefit for small businesses. For example, while
Arizona law establishes fairly comprehensive provisions that mirror most
aspects of the RFA, the Alabama laws cited by the SBA as responsive to
the needs of small businesses actually make no mention of, and compel no
regulatory concern for, small businesses or entrepreneurs at all.180 Alaska‘s
small business flexibility law was repealed effective January 1, 2009.
179. Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Model Legislation Initiative, U.S. SMALL
BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, http://archive.sba.gov/advo/laws/law_modeleg.html
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
180. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41–1035 (2010) (demonstrating Arizona‘s
comprehensive statute applicable to small businesses); ALA. CODE §§ 41–22–23 (2010)
(demonstrating Alabama‘s lack of regulation applicable to small businesses).
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While many states have adopted a regulatory structure similar to the
RFA, some states have added their own innovations designed to improve
communication between agencies and small businesses. In May 2009, for
example, Connecticut augmented its own regulatory flexibility laws. Like
the RFA, Connecticut state law had already required agencies to estimate
the cost of proposed regulations on small businesses and assess their likely
impact before enacting them. The new law, however, requires state
agencies to go a step further by notifying the public about how to obtain
copies of the new small business impact analysis and the regulatory
flexibility analysis in advance of the public comment period for the
proposed regulation.181 The fact that ninety-four percent of Connecticut‘s
73,000 employers have fewer than one hundred employees underscores the
importance of providing this notice to small businesses in the state.182
Several states have created remarkably effective, low-cost options for
improving their agencies‘ responsiveness to small business concerns. The
SBA itself highlighted certain state innovations in its 2007 publication,
―State Guide to Regulatory Flexibility for Small Businesses,‖ a guide to the
―best practices‖ state governments have adopted to improve regulatory
flexibility for small firms. The SBA also monitors state law developments
on its website. Why, one might ask, doesn‘t the federal government
consider amending the RFA to incorporate some of the ―best practices‖ the
SBA has identified among these state innovations?
Many of the innovations created at the state level could be adapted by
federal agencies. One such innovation is email notification. Rhode Island,
for example, has created a Rules Tracker system that allows individuals to
customize their email updates by specifying the agencies and keywords
they want to monitor. The Rules Tracker system is accessible from the
home page for Rhode Island‘s rules and regulations database, where small
businesses can complete a simple registration procedure.183
After
registering for the service, users can choose to receive notifications from
any or all of the state‘s regulatory agencies, the state police, the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General and other government divisions. Users can
also specify the keywords for which they want to receive alerts and choose
whether they want to receive alerts on a daily, weekly or monthly basis.
Similarly, Colorado‘s state government website enables businesses to
sign up for free email alerts to notify them whenever a state agency
proposes a rule change involving certain keywords that the businesses have
181. Connecticut Is Latest New England State To Strengthen Regulatory Flexibility for
Small Business, supra note 36.
182. Id.
183. Rules
Tracker,
STATE
OF
RHODE
ISLAND,
available
at
http://www.rules.state.ri.us/rules/freshregs/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (simple registration
required).
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identified.184 Under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act, state
agencies must file copies of proposed rules and amendments to existing
rules with a central agency, which then generates an automatic email to
interested parties who have registered for this free service.185 The sign-up
form is a single page on which small business owners and other
stakeholders identify the general subjects of rulemaking that they are
interested in.186 Other states with comparable internet tools that promote
the transparency of the rulemaking process include Alaska, Illinois,
Kentucky, Nebraska, Virginia and Wisconsin.
Another state innovation that federal agencies might adopt is the
creation of small business regulatory review boards. In Hawaii, for
example, the Small Business Regulatory Review Board consists of current
and former small business owners appointed by the Governor, and meets
monthly.187 Its duties include commenting to regulatory agencies on the
impact of existing and proposed regulation on small businesses, and
reviewing requests from small business owners for review of state and
county administrative rules.188 The Board has also set up sub-committees
to work with individual agencies between monthly meetings, increasing the
potential for more focused and productive relationships with those
agencies.189 Missouri has a Small Business Regulatory Fairness Board
serving much the same purpose, as do Oklahoma and South Carolina.190
While a single review board obviously would be impractical for the
federal government, major federal agencies could consider developing
similar review boards, consisting of current and/or past small business
owners whose businesses are (or were) directly affected by that agency‘s
rules. If the board consisted of volunteers, as they do in the Hawaii model,
the cost could be minimal as well.
Other states maintain periodically updated lists of proposed
184. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, STATE GUIDE TO REGULATORY
FLEXIBILITY 17 (2007), http://archive.sba.gov/advo/laws/rfa_stateguide07.pdf.
185. Id.
186. Sign-up Form, COLO. OFFICIAL STATE WEB PORTAL, OFFICE OF POLICY, RESEARCH
AND REGULATORY REFORM, http://www.dora.state.co.us/pls/real/sb121_web.signup_form
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
187. Small Business Regulatory Review Board, HAW. DEP‘T OF BUS., ECON. DEV. &
TOURISM, http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/business/start_grow/small-business-info/sbrrb (last visited
Feb. 2, 2011).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. MO. SMALL BUS. REGULATORY FAIRNESS BD., http://www.sbrfb.ded.mo.gov/ (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011); Small Business Advocacy, OKLA. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE,
http://www.okcommerce.gov/Businesses-And-Employers/Small-Business-Advocacy (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011); Small Business Resources, S.C. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE,
http://sccommerce.com/business-services/business-services/small-business-resources (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011).
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regulations that may have an impact on small businesses. Ohio, for
example, posts a list that is updated weekly.191 In a variation of this type of
service, California maintains a list of the agencies that ―frequently propose
regulations that can have a major impact on small businesses,‖ with
hyperlinks to each agency‘s current list of proposed rules, on its ―Small
Business Advocate‖ website.192
If federal agencies were required to develop similar outreach efforts,
small businesses would be better able to stay informed about potential rule
changes that could affect them. This could be a relatively inexpensive and
potentially effective measure for federal agencies to take when they are
considering new rules.
The effectiveness of state models may be limited, however, by
unpredictable and inconsistent interpretations of what constitutes a ―small
business.‖ State attempts to define ―small business‖ more clearly than the
RFA does have met with mixed results. In Vermont, for example, state law
requires state agencies to consider the impact of proposed regulations on
small businesses.193 A separate state law defines ―small business‖ as ―a
business employing no more than twenty full-time employees.‖194 Vermont
courts, however, have ruled that state agencies need not use that statutory
definition when considering the impact of proposed regulations on small
businesses; instead, the agencies themselves may choose any definition of
―small business‖ that is ―rational and effective‖ in light of the regulation at
issue. In Gasoline Marketers of Vermont, Inc. v. Agency of Natural
Resources,195 the Supreme Court of Vermont rejected a challenge to a
regulation that would have required gasoline stations to install vapor
recovery systems on their pumps, but would have exempted gasoline
stations with a throughput of 400,000 gallons or less from that requirement.
The plaintiff challenged the regulation because it alleged that the agency
failed to consider the impact on small businesses, as required by state law;
throughput volume, they alleged, did not correlate with the size of the
business. According to the plaintiff, the agency had ―failed to identify
which gas stations were small businesses, determine how many gas stations
were small businesses, calculate what volume of gas they sold, and analyze
the cost of compliance for them,‖ even though the information necessary to
191. Small Business Rules and Regulations, OHIO DEP‘T OF DEV.,
http://www.development.ohio.gov/Entrepreneurship/SBRegister1.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2011).
192. Small Business Advocate, CA.GOV, http://sba.ca.gov/index.php (last visited Feb. 2,
2011).
193. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 832a (2011). This law was enacted in 1985, five years after
passage of the RFA.
194. Id. at § 801(b)(12). This definition was also adopted in 1985, in the same session as
Vermont‘s version of the RFA.
195. 739 A.2d 1230 (1999).
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complete this analysis was readily available to the agency.196
In siding with the agency, the Court noted that:
[Small businesses] cannot demand that ANR use any particular
methodology as opposed to another [to comply with state
requirements]. Here, ANR‘s methodology was reasonable, both
in minimizing the cost burden of compliance and maximizing
attainment of environmental standards. Given the purposes of
the regulation, the throughput measure of small businesses was
more relevant both in terms of economic impact . . . and efficacy
of the regulations . . . . It would be illogical to forbid the agency
from operating in a manner that was rational and effective.197
In effect, the Gasoline Marketers of Vermont case made it impossible
for small firms to demand that state agencies use the statutory definition of
―small business,‖ suggesting instead that the agencies themselves were
better equipped to decide how to define those interests than either the state
legislature or the firms who actually held those interests. This case
suggests the potential complexity and likely challenge to any federal
definition of ―small‖ business for RFA purposes.
B.

Expand Small Business Offices Within Agencies.

Another way for agencies to strengthen agency business partnerships
is to dedicate resources specifically to helping small businesses and,
crucially, to publicizing those efforts so that small businesses can take
advantage of them. Depending on the agency, it may make sense to create
a commission or designate an ―in-house‖ representative dedicated to
improving communication with small businesses.
The FTC provides an example, albeit an imperfect one, of how an
agency might dedicate resources to small business concerns. Its Small
Business Compliance Assistance Policy Statement describes various forms
of assistance that the FTC makes available to help small businesses comply
with truth-in-advertising laws. The FTC also includes an expanding library
of materials written especially for small businesses within the Business
Guidance section of the FTC‘s website. Finally, the agency invites small
businesses to contact either the FTC headquarters or one of the agency‘s
regional offices with specific inquiries about compliance.198 In practice,
however, there is no particular group within the FTC that appears
designated to receive inquiries from small businesses. Given the typical
196. Id. at 1233 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 1234-35.
198. Advertising FAQ’s: A Guide for Small Business, FED. TRADE COMM‘N BUREAU OF
CONSUMER PROT. BUS. CTR., http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus35-advertising-faqsguide-small-business (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
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entrepreneur‘s limited time and resources, she would likely find it hard to
locate someone within the agency bureaucracy who was knowledgeable
about, and sympathetic to, her unique needs and concerns.
Similarly, the FDA‘s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER) offers focused support for small businesses.199 Unlike the FTC,
however, the FDA has designated small business contacts in both its
national headquarters and two of its five regional offices, which represent
more than a third of the states as well as the US/Mexico border generally.200
C.

Balance Small Business Concerns with Broader Impact.

An important, but overlooked, area of concern is that some of the
small business exemptions that the RFA has facilitated may be
counterproductive in some respects by potentially undermining the broad
purposes of the legislation they affect. The SBA‘s 2007 report on the cost
savings achieved by the RFA describes a number of examples of small
businesses being excused from regulations whose overall social and
environmental benefits might well exceed the short-term costs borne by
affected small businesses. Environmental impact is just one of many areas
where this sort of undesirable trade-off might occur. For example, the
report noted that the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) had initially
designated 18,031 square miles of critical habitat for the Canada Lynx. In
response to ―comments‖ by the SBA and various small businesses,
however, the FWS ultimately designated only 1841 square miles of
protected lynx habitat based on ―economic‖ and other factors, reducing its
proposed conservation area by some ninety percent. While the SBA report
noted that the ―exclusion of these high-cost areas resulted in $919 million
in cost savings,‖ the report did not analyze the resulting cost to the
lynxes.201 Similarly, the FWS excluded private lands from a critical habitat
designation for certain endangered minnows, in response to concerns
voiced by small businesses, because of ―economic factors.‖202
In assessing the RFA‘s cost savings to small businesses, the SBA does
199. See, e.g., Small Business Assistance: Contact, Organization & Meeting Information,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm069
901.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (providing information for small businesses relating to
the development and approval process).
200. Small
Business
Contacts,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/SmallBusinessAssistance/SmallBusinessRepresentatives/de
fault.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
201. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, REPORT ON THE REGULATORY
FLEXIBILITY
ACT
FY
2007,
23
(2008),
available
at
http://archive.sba.gov/advo/laws/flex/07regflx.pdf.
202. Id.
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not appear to have quantified or even considered the potential longer-term
costs that such tradeoffs may generate, let alone compared them to the
estimated savings experienced by the small business owners. In smoothing
the path for small business owners, the government must not bulldoze over
equally important, but perhaps less immediately quantifiable, broader
concerns.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While the economic significance of small businesses has only become
more important since the RFA‘s introduction thirty years ago, the RFA has
not met its promise of increasing regulatory flexibility to accommodate
those businesses‘ concerns. The RFA increased awareness among federal
regulators that small businesses have unique concerns and that regulation
must take those concerns into account in order to maximize effectiveness,
but its shortcomings have undercut its effectiveness. Instead, a new
approach is needed. An interactive and multifaceted approach that
capitalizes on the reforms introduced by the Open Government Initiative to
engage small businesses in a dialogue with regulators would generate many
of the benefits that the RFA originally intended to convey.
Understanding the unique legal, regulatory and practical challenges
that small firms face is a critical first step toward realizing these potential
gains. Recent research demonstrates that small businesses have the
capacity for greater political activity than might be expected, although they
tend to lack the resources necessary for success using the traditional models
of engaging with regulatory agencies. Because small businesses are
disproportionately burdened by regulation, they may be uniquely motivated
to seek regulatory flexibility.
Recent government directives increasing the transparency and
participatory nature of regulation have the potential to serve small
businesses well. Small businesses have an unprecedented opportunity to
make strategic use of these initiatives and to help bring about the kind of
regulatory flexibility that the RFA fell short of achieving. The most
competitive small businesses will benefit significantly as a result. There
are also new strategies available to federal agencies, often modeled on
innovations at the state level, for improving responsiveness to small
businesses‘ concerns and overall efficiency.
While the RFA sought to raise agency awareness of small businesses‘
concerns, it has not been sufficient to address those concerns effectively.
Only recently have initiatives emerged at both the federal and state level
that genuinely empower small firms to help reduce and reform the
regulatory burdens on them. By taking advantage of new directives and
technology to help fill the gap left by the RFA and its subsequent
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amendments, small firms can now interact with regulators to alleviate the
pressure of the most burdensome rules. These reforms are necessary.
Without them, the possibility exists that thirty years later a new generation
of scholars will hold a symposium titled, ―The RFA at 60,‖ and continue to
wrestle with the same unresolved questions.

